How to design, run, and act on a phishing simulation program — the metrics that matter, industry benchmarks, and the ethical guardrails that keep it a training exercise, not a trap.
Awareness training tells your team what to watch for. A simulation is the only way to find out whether it worked — and phishing remains the most common single way attackers get in.
That gap — seconds to click, minutes to report — is exactly what a simulation program is built to close.
These three numbers measure different failure points. Collapsing them into one "click rate" headline hides where the actual risk is.
Opened the link. Lowest-severity signal on its own — browsing to a page isn't compromise, but it's the funnel's top of the top.
Entered real credentials on a simulated login page. The highest-impact failure mode — this is the number that maps to actual account-takeover risk.
Flagged it instead of acting on it. The behavior you're actually trying to build — a workforce that reports is a detection layer, not just a weak point.
Verizon's 2.7% average click rate and KnowBe4's 33.1% baseline "Phish-Prone Percentage" are not the same measurement — different samples, different methodology, different definition of a "fail." Don't average them together or treat one as validating the other. Use each on its own terms.
| Industry | Baseline Phish-Prone % |
|---|---|
| Hospitality & Education (highest-risk sectors) | ~50%+ |
| Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals | 41.9% |
| Insurance | 39.2% |
| Retail & Wholesale | 36.5% |
| Global average, all industries | 33.1% |
| Finance & Banking | 29.8% |
| Technology | 28.5% |
| Same population, after 12 months of ongoing training | 4.1% |
Per Verizon's separate 2.7% figure: training moves the report rate far more than the click rate — trained users report at 21% versus 5% for untrained users, but the click-rate improvement is smaller. A simulation program without a training and reporting workflow attached mostly just produces a scary number — it doesn't reduce risk on its own.
A single campaign tells you one data point. A program — run on a cadence, across pretext types relevant to your actual risk — tells you a trend.
A phishing simulation is a test of a process, not a trap for individuals. The SANS Institute's own guidance on this is explicit: deceiving employees without care for what you're asking them to react to is its own kind of harm.
The results themselves don't reduce risk. What you do with them does.